In Ramcharitar v. Gill, the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision, and subsequently brought an ICBC claim for non-pecuniary damages, as well as various other forms of damages. The trial was heard by a judge and jury, with the jury concluding that the Defendant was liable for the accident, but that the negligent conduct had not caused or contributed to the Plaintiff‘s injuries in any way. As such, the jury did not award the Plaintiff any damages. Immediately following the verdict, ICBC’S lawyer made an application to have the claim dismissed, which was granted. The formal Judgment had yet to be entered when counsel for the Plaintiff made an application, pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court and the Rules of Court, to set aside the verdict of the jury and for a new trial or, in the alternative, to have the trial judge substitute his own verdict for that of the jury. The trial judge dismissed the applications by Plaintiff‘s counsel.
 I also note that plaintiff’s counsel was given an opportunity to comment on the substantive elements of the jury charge and questions. Although he made submissions regarding other parts of the charge, neither he nor defendant’s counsel took issue with the part of the charge concerning negligence. I do not accept that the charge is defective but, if I am wrong, the issue is for the Court of Appeal.
 As I understand the plaintiff’s second issue, he says that there was clearly evidence to support a finding that the negligent conduct of the defendant caused some injury to the plaintiff, even if it was much less extensive than the plaintiff claimed. He points out that the defendant did not argue otherwise. As the sole finder of fact, the jury is entitled to accept all, none or part of the evidence put forward on behalf of the plaintiff. It is obvious that the jury rejected the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses in its entirety. Whether it was reasonable for the jury to do so in the circumstances is a question potentially for the Court of Appeal but, in my view, a trial judge may not reject such a finding.
 This is not a case of a jury making a finding that has no evidentiary basis which would be subject to correction by a trial judge exercising his or her inherent jurisdiction. In substance, the plaintiff’s complaint is that the jury should not have answered the second question in the negative, at least having regard to the apparently undisputed evidence before it. In my view, no trial judge could ever intervene or reinstruct a jury in such a circumstance without saying, in effect, that his or her view of the reliability of some, or all, of the evidence should prevail over the view of the jury.
 In an alternative argument, the plaintiff complained of statements made by counsel for the defendant during closing submissions to the jury. Counsel for the plaintiff did not raise those complaints after the submission and I would not accede to them at this late juncture.