In Raguin v ICBC, the British Columbia Court of Appeal confirmed that coverage for massage therapy under your ICBC policy accident benefits is mandatory, and not merely permissive. The Plaintiff had sought reimbursement for massage therapy costs, however ICBC had refused. The Plaintiff was successful at trial, and the decision was upheld on appeal. This is an important decision for injured claimants, as, previously, ICBC would not provide massage therapy benefits beyond eight weeks of the accident.
 The following observations about ss. 88(1) and (2) are uncontentious. The imperative word “shall” is used in relation to ICBC’s obligation to pay for the benefits described in s. 88(1), making such payments mandatory. Under s. 88(2), ICBC is given discretion, as indicated by the permissive word “may”, to pay for additional benefits that are “likely to promote the rehabilitation of an insured who is injured in an accident”.
 Although the benefits listed in s. 88(1) are mandatory, ICBC has a limited power to challenge an insured’s claim made under that subsection. This power is derived from the requirements that the expenses incurred must be both necessary and reasonable. In determining whether a particular treatment is necessary and reasonable, ICBC may require a medical examination of the insured under s. 99(1) of the Regulation. ICBC may also demand a medical certificate under s. 98(1) of the Regulation or a medical report under s. 28 of the Act.
 ICBC has referred to the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to express one thing is to exclude another), to support its submissions. The maxim presumes that the Legislature has not erred in excluding a particular thing; if the Legislature meant to include a particular thing, it would have done so expressly: Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed (Canada: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) (“Sullivan”) at 244. ICBC argues that failure to expressly include “massage therapy” alongside the comparable items “physical therapy” and “chiropractic treatment” in s. 88(1) supports that massage therapy was deliberately excluded.
 Physical therapy is a mandatory benefit under s. 88(1) but it is not defined in the Regulation. The dictionary definition and the definition in the related regulatory scheme define physical therapy as including massage. The Health Professions Act defines “health profession”. Regulation of health professions, such as physical therapy, includes the restriction of the provision of a designated service to a person registered to practise that specific designated health profession. Massage therapy is designated as a health profession and is governed by the Massage Therapists Regulation. Registration with the College of Massage Therapists is required and no person other than a registrant may practise massage therapy.
 In light of the provisions to which I have referred, ICBC’s submission that including massage therapy as a benefit payable under s. 88(1) would open the floodgates to all manner of questionable procedures is unsupportable.
 While the Regulation does not refer specifically to massage therapy in s. 88(1), I am of the view that, when all of the relevant provisions in the Regulation are read together with the Health Professions Act and its related Regulations, physical therapy may properly be interpreted as including massage therapy. To be payable under s. 88(1), the other requirements must be met as stated in the section; that is: “[w]here an insured is injured in an accident for which benefits are provided under this Part, the corporation shall … pay as benefits all reasonable expenses incurred by the insured as a result of the injury for … necessary physical therapy … .”
 In this case, the respondents’ doctor recommended massage therapy as part of the infant plaintiffs’ recovery. There is no suggestion that the recommended treatment was unnecessary or provided by someone other than a registered massage therapist, or that the expense was unreasonable.