In Perret v John Doe, the Plaintiff was injured when she was run off the road by a U-Haul truck. The driver fled the scene, and the issue became whether or not the driver had implied consent to operate the truck in question. In considering all of the evidence, the Court ruled that it was reasonable to infer, on a balance of probabilities, that the driver had the implied consent of U-Haul.
 ICBC draws to my attention the heavy burden imposed on commercial enterprises such as U-Haul that consent to the rental of their vehicles. Barreiro v. Arana, 2003 BCCA 58 (CanLII), 2003 BCCA 58 [Barreiro], discusses s. 86 of the Motor Vehicle Act. Beginning at para. 26, Thackray J.A., speaking for the court, wrote:
 The effect that legislative intent has upon the meaning of “consent” is emphasized by the words of Goldie J.A. in Morrison as quoted by the trial judge:
 It is apparent the legislature has imposed a heavy burden on those who have within their power the control of motor vehicles. … The reason for legislative intervention may be traced, in part at least, to the appalling consequences of reckless use of motor vehicles. Irresponsibility on the part of those who may deny or confer possession of motor vehicles may be seen as the reason for the legislative initiative. The legislation in question must be regarded as remedial.
 Legislative intention must be acknowledged as having a fundamental purpose and as having been inspired by a need. As Mr. Justice Goldie said, the legislation is remedial. As such it might well be at odds with traditional legal concepts of agency, but that will not deny its validity.
 The legislative intent in section 86 must be taken, as noted by Goldie J.A. in Morrison, to address the reckless use of motor vehicles and the section imposes “a heavy burden on those who have within their power the control of motor vehicles.” In Bareham, Mr. Justice MacDonell, after reviewing the statute, said at 194:
In this case, the only policy reasons to be considered are those in favour of protecting innocent third parties seeking compensation for injuries suffered at the hands of negligent automobile drivers and, vicariously, owners.
 Whether there was consent must be determined by reference to the facts and by the application of general legal principles viewed in the context of the statutory scheme. The issue of consent is not, as suggested by the trial judge, “defined by s.86”: however the statute is the governing factor. [Emphasis in original.]
 I derive from Barreiro that as in all cases the facts must be carefully scrutinized, but in doing so the legislative intent to impose vicarious liability predicated on consent “is the governing factor.” The usual principles of agency that may lead to a finding of vicarious liability are not of paramount importance. It is the legislative scheme to create a heavy burden on those who have vehicles for hire which must be given considerable weight.
 When considering the circumstances of the accident of May 12, 2005, there is obviously no certainty when attempting to reach a conclusion that the U-Haul vehicle was driven by a person who had consent. However, the law does not require certainty. It does require that I draw a reasonable inference and do not rely on conjecture. The Court of Appeal in Lee  B.C.J. No. 2459, has described Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd.,  A.C. 152 (H.L.) [Caswell], as the leading case making that distinction. In Caswell, at 169-70, Lord Wright observed:
My Lords, the precise manner in which the accident occurred cannot be ascertained as the unfortunate young man was alone when he was killed. The Court therefore is left to inference or circumstantial evidence. Inference must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation. There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical certainty as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inference does not go beyond reasonable probability. But if there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture.
 I conclude I can safely draw an inference that it is more likely than not that the driver had consent. I therefore answer question 2 in the affirmative.