In Walker v. John Doe and I.C.B.C., the Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle when he was injured by a flying tire from a truck. The identities of the truck driver and owner were never ascertained. The Plaintiff subsequently brought an ICBC hit and run claim for damages for pain and suffering, as well as various other forms of damages. On the 14th day of trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial after hearing closing submissions from counsel for the Plaintiff. ICBC’S lawyer then sought costs orders against counsel for the Plaintiff and/or the Plaintiff himself. Counsel for each argued that the trial judge hearing the new trial should ultimately decide the issues of costs, however ICBC’S lawyer argued otherwise, namely that the trial judge of the original trial should be the one to decide. The trial judge of the original eventually ruled that he would be in a better position to address costs.
 The broad question of whether there is a “longstanding practice” in this province that directs that the costs arising from a mistrial should be assessed by the ultimate trial judge misses an important aspect of the particular issue before me. The issue on this application is not, as the Response filed by the plaintiff suggests, whether “[t]he allocation of costs thrown away as a result of the mistrial should be in the ultimate cause or decided by the judge before whom the case is ultimately tried”.
 The real issue, instead, is who should hear an application for costs, following a mistrial, when the dominant focus of that cost application is an order for special costs against counsel for the party that caused the mistrial. The fact that the dominant, if not overwhelming, focus of the defendant’s application is an order for special costs against counsel is patent from the submissions of the parties as well as from the materials and authorities that each has filed.
 I have also considered whether, having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, I should defer dealing with the substance of the application until after the appeal of the Mistrial Ruling. This would have the benefit of avoiding the costs that would be incurred in hearing the application and that would be wasted if the plaintiff is successful in its appeal of the Mistrial Ruling or, indeed, from these reasons. Conversely, if the Mistrial Ruling is upheld, I expect, having regard to the history of the matter, that any cost order I make will likely be appealed in any event. On balance I consider it better and more efficient to have each of the Mistrial Ruling, these reasons, as well as the eventual reasons from the cost application available before the hearing before the Court of Appeal takes place.