In Vandendorpel v. Evoy, the Plaintiff was a pedestrian who was injured in a motor vehicle accident when he was struck in a crosswalk at a controlled intersection. The Plaintiff consequently commenced an ICBC claim, and then later commenced formal legal proceedings. Liability was disputed by ICBC’S lawyer.
At trial, the judge considered the relevant and applicable statutory duties and obligations of the Plaintiff, as a pedestrian, under the Motor Vehicle Act, but did not do so for the driver. The trial judge also did not review the expert evidence as it related to the speed of the Defendant driver. The trial judge would eventually dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim.
The Plaintiff appealed, with counsel for the Plaintiff arguing that the trial judge failed to take into consideration numerous statutory provisions under the Motor Vehicle Act with respect to whether or not the Defendant driver breached the standard of care.
The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, and remitted the matter back to the trial judge to reconsider the issues.
 In the circumstances, in my view, it was necessary for the trial judge to undertake an analysis of the applicable statutory provisions, and relate those to the facts found. I do not mean by that to suggest that there is any particular outcome to the analysis which must be undertaken, but only that, in analyzing the defendant’s duty of care, these statutory provisions should have been considered and reviewed. Nor do I suggest that the only matters that are germane are the statutory provisions. Clearly the duties imposed by the common law include a duty to exercise due care, to keep a proper lookout, and to take precautions when there is an apparent hazard.
 As noted by Mr. Finn, the trial judge did not go on to determine the question of causation because he found that Mr. Evoy met the duty of care. For a finding of liability against Mr. Evoy it was necessary to find both a breach of the duty owed to Mr. Vandendorpel and that the breach was a cause of the injury.