In Tambosso v. Holmes, the Plaintiff was injured in two motor vehicle collisions, and sought non-pecuniary damages for pain and suffering for physical and psychological injuries. As a result of one of the accidents, the Plaintiff alleged to have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a major depressive disorder, and a mild traumatic brain injury.
The trial lasted for 33 days. The trial judge did not accept the evidence of the Plaintiff, particularly with respect to the Plaintiff’s claim for PTSD. The total amount of the judgement was less than the amounts of money previously advanced by ICBC to the Plaintiff. As a result, the Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed.
Counsel for the Plaintiff advanced numerous grounds of appeal, most notably that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, which included the events of the one accident which the Plaintiff alleged to have suffered PTSD from ; the evidence of the Plaintiff’s family doctor who diagnosed the PTSD; the evidence of a neuropsychologist; and the evidence of numerous lay witnesses who supported the Plaintiff’s claim for PTSD.
In regards to the accident where the Plaintiff alleged to have suffered PTSD from, the Plaintiff alleged that the look on the Defendant’s face, in conjunction with him driving towards her, led her to believe that he was going to kill her. The trial judge did not accept such a scenario occurred, believing it to be a fabrication. As a result, he did not consider other evidence of lay witnesses that corroborated the Plaintiff’s version of events, nor did he consider the evidence of the Plaintiff’s experts, as he was of the belief that such reports were based on the Plaintiff’s version of events, which he found to be false. The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of the Plaintiff in this regard.
Despite the Court of Appeal acknowledging that there were issues with the Plaintiff’s credibility, a new trial was ordered.
 The judge misapprehended the evidence of Ms. Tambosso in terms of whether she saw the eyes or look on the defendant’s face, which, in conjunction with him driving towards her, was relied on to establish her claim for PTSD. In finding that her evidence was a complete fabrication, he failed to address the corroborating evidence of Ms. Greenwood, which he appears to have otherwise accepted, and does not address the fact that the corroborating evidence occurs before Mr. Leal approached the Mazda. As noted by Ms. Tambosso’s counsel, the trial judge has established an artificial conflict in the evidence between Ms. Tambosso and Mr. Leal, where none existed.
 The trial judge concluded that he could not accept the opinions of Ms. Tambosso’s experts as their opinions were based primarily on her version of events of the 2008 accident, which he found did not happen. He did not consider the evidence of Dr. Lanius or Dr. Rasmussen, whose opinions did not rely solely on her self-reporting, but on the tests that were conducted which included measures of validity (see Loveridge v. British Columbia, 2007 BCCA 425 (CanLII)).
 In my view, the trial judge failed to analyze and determine, on the whole of the evidence, whether and to what extent Ms. Tambosso suffered damages as a result of the two accidents. Instead, he focussed on the findings of an event, seconds in the making, rather than the big picture in terms of the change in her post-accident condition, the significance of the change, and whether it was caused, wholly or in part, by the accident. In my view, completely discounting the expert evidence based on a questionable finding of fact, and wholly disregarding the evidence of 15 witnesses who supported the opinions of the experts and Ms. Tambosso’s evidence in terms of her post-accident condition, amounts to an overriding and palpable error.
 However, it is also clear, in my view, that the errors by the trial judge are of such import that the only resolution is a new trial. As such, I do not find it necessary to address the remaining grounds of appeal.