In Smith v. Rautenberg, the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident, and subsequently brought an ICBC claim for pain and suffering for various injuries, as well as other forms of damages. An issue arose as to the production of raw test data of the Plaintiff‘s neuropsychologist, after the expert report had been served. Counsel for the Plaintiff wished for there to be a restriction on the production of such documentation in that it would go directly to a registered psychologist, rather than ICBC’S lawyer. Counsel for the Plaintiff also argued that the raw test data was privileged. ICBC’S lawyer argued that the raw test data was relevant and should be disclosed. The Court ordered the raw test data to be disclosed to defence counsel.
 As the report has been served, no issue of solicitor/client privilege attaches.
 Counsel for the applicant defendant correctly submits that there is nothing in the Code of Conduct to substantiate the apparent position of the College Psychologists of BC that test material cannot be released except to another psychologist or psychological service provider in another jurisdiction. He is correct. That is not what the Code of Conduct states.
 In making my decision, I agree with what was written by Southin J.A., namely that when an expert in one field in possession of documents says that someone from a different discipline is not competent to understand his work, that the court is to be slow to overrule his judgment. That is a very different thing from saying that the documentation could not be produced to counsel for the party seeking production. If that party choses to have the documents interpreted by someone not competent to understand them, lack of competence will be readily available to a trial judge and will work against the party who conducts litigation in that way.
 I also respectfully agree that courts must not run rough shod over those who are not parties to the proceedings. That is why the Rules require delivery of notices of applications to non-parties from whom documents are sought.
 The evidence before Master Horn in Davies was that there was an ethical restriction placed on the neuropsychologist to prevent disclosure. The actual evidence that was presented in that case is not before me.
 I had evidence before me of the current Code of Conduct. So long as Dr. Pirolli complies with the Code of Conduct, and in particular that portion of the Code of Conduct set out in subparagraph 1.2, reproduced above in para. 28, her ethical requirements are met.