Claims for damages arising from wrongful death accidents are brought under the Family Compensation Act, a statute in much need of reform.
In Haczewski v. British Columbia, the Plaintiff was killed in a motor vehicle accident when struck by a speeding police cruiser. The Plaintiff’s widow, and the Plaintiff’s parents, brought a claim for damages for wrongful death under the Family Compensation Act. The Court awarded damages to both the widow of the Plaintiff, and to the parents of the Plaintiff, however far more damages were awarded to the widow. The types of damages claimed were loss of past and future support, both financial and for household services; income tax gross up and management fees; loss of love, guidance and affection; special damages; and interest pursuant to the Court Order Interest Act.
[75] The leading case for the assessment of damages in fatal accident cases in this province is Ruiz v. Bouaziz, 2001 BCCA 207, where the Court of Appeal said this:
[53] [Skelding v. Skelding (1994), 95 B.C.L.R. (2d) 201 (C.A.)] supports the proposition that the normal tort measure of damages is to apply to fatal accident cases as it does to non-fatal accident cases. The basic principle is that the injured person is to be compensated for the full amount of his actual loss and no more, as Gibbs J.A explained at para. 18:
It may be that what has led to confusion in the reported judgments which do not apply the tort principles clarified in Ratych v. Bloomer [(1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 25 (S.C.C.)] is a failure to distinguish between the right to be compensated for loss and the kind of loss which will be compensable. Where the injured person survives, the loss is customarily classified into the separate heads of non-pecuniary, lost wages past and future, future care and the like. Whereas, when the injured party does not survive, the loss for which the claimants are entitled to be compensated is, as Dickson J. said in Keizer v. Hanna the amount which will provide at least the equal of what might have been expected to have been provided by the deceased person but for the accident. The assessment of the appropriate amount is to be “neither punitive nor influenced by sentimentality. It is largely an exercise of business judgment.”
[54] In summary, in a family compensation claim, family members may claim damages proportioned to the pecuniary loss they suffered as a result of the loss of a relationship with a loved one. The loss of anticipated benefit that must be compensated has been called globally “dependency” and it must be assessed by the exercise of “business judgment.”
[55] A precise formula for exercising that business judgment has proven elusive. Innumerable authorities have considered how to approach the assessment of the loss of dependency. Many were cited to us. One of the most succinct statements of the basis for awarding compensation under fatal accident legislation is that of Cartwright J. in Proctor v. Dyck, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 244 at 249:
To entitle a claimant to damages under the Fatal Accidents Act it is not essential that he should have been financially dependent upon the deceased or that the deceased should have been under any legal liability to provide for him or that he should have enjoyed any benefits from the deceased in his lifetime. It is sufficient if it is shown that the claimant had a reasonable expectation of deriving pecuniary advantage from the deceased’s remaining alive which has been disappointed by his death.
[56] The legal goal, then, is to ascertain the true value of the pecuniary advantage each claimant lost because Mrs. Ruiz did not remain alive.
See also McVea v. T.B., 2002 BCSC 1407 and James v. Gillis, 2011 BCSC 826.